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Abstract 
In this dissertation, we are concerned with the influence mechanism of 
large shareholders’ ownership characteristics on earnings quality in listed 
companies, where both theoretical analysis and empirical test are taken into 
consideration. The dissertation is organized as follows:  
In Chapter 1, introduction, we address the motivation of our research, 
principal concepts employed throughout this thesis, the content organization, as 
well as key contributions of this dissertation. 
Chapter 2 is devoted to literature review. Since our focus is on the 
relationship between ownership characteristics and earnings quality, we review 
overseas and domestic related literature in this research field, while concise 
analysis and discussion are also undertaken for the corresponding literature. 
Theoretical analysis is carried out in Chapter 3. At first, we review the most 
recent theoretical development of investor protection and the alignment effect 
and entrenchment effect of large shareholders in the finance literature. Based on 
this, a theoretical framework is proposed for the relationship between ownership 
characteristics and earnings quality in the generalized sense, where related 
knowledge is employed from different fields like accounting, economics, law, as 
well as corporate governance, taking agency conflicts of a company as a bridge 
between ownership characteristics and earnings quality. On the basis of the 
constructed theoretical framework, we clarify the basic argument of this 
dissertation. In countries, where firms have relatively concentrated ownership, 
ownership characteristics of large shareholders are the most influential 
mechanism for the strategy choice of large shareholders and hence for earnings 
quality.  Moreover, ownership characteristics of large shareholders can more 
efficiently explain cross-sectional differences of earnings quality between 














institutional background of China, we theoretically analyze the concrete 
mechanism of large shareholders’ ownership characteristics affecting earnings 
quality in the last part of Chapter 3, where the analysis is carried out in different 
respects, such as the ultimate ownership, the status of large shareholders, the 
ownership proportion of large shareholders, the intermediate mechanism of large 
shareholders affecting earnings quality, and the balancing mechanism of 
ownership. 
Empirical tests are carried out in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5, in order to 
provide empirical supports for the theoretical results obtained in Chapter 3. 
Thereby, earnings quality is concretized by earnings management and value 
relevance. Specifically speaking, essential conclusions from the empirical tests 
are as follows: 
Firstly, ownership characteristics of listed companies in China significantly 
impact earnings management. Our investigations show that, because companies 
under the ultimate state-control often realize their earnings goal via receiving 
financial subsidy from the government, the absolute value of discretionary 
accruals, which is referred to as absolute DA value in the sequel, for these firms 
is relatively low compared to firms without the ultimate state-control. If we 
classify firms under the ultimate state-control further, firms under the direct 
control from government agencies will have a relatively low absolute DA value. 
Taking the selected sample data as a whole, the absolute DA value decreases as 
the ownership proportion of the largest shareholder increases. If the chairman of 
the board is the largest shareholder's manager, or if the proportion of 
representatives of the largest shareholder in the board is high, the absolute DA 
value will be relatively low. But for listed companies under the direct control of 
a state-owned operating group, the absolute DA value will increase, when the 
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If there is a second largest shareholder with ownership proportion over 10 
percent, the absolute DA value will decrease consequently. On the other hand, in 
firms without the ultimate state-control, it is difficult for the second largest 
shareholder to execute its balance function. 
Secondly, ownership characteristics significantly affect the value relevance. 
Our investigations show that the value relevance is relatively low in the list 
companies under the ultimate state-control, compared to companies without the 
ultimate state-control. If we distinguish companies under the ultimate 
state-control further, listed companies under the direct control of government 
institutions have a lower value relevance, while the value relevance of 
companies under the direct control of a state-owned operating group is relatively 
high. With the increase of the ownership proportion of the largest shareholder, 
the value relevance exhibits an U-shape tendency for listed companies in the 
unregulated industry, i.e., the value relevance increases after a decreasing 
procedure. If the chairman of the board is the largest shareholder's manager, or if 
the proportion of representatives of the largest shareholder in the board of 
directors is high, the absolute DA value will be relatively high. If there exists a 
second largest shareholder with relevant influences, the value relevance will 
decrease for a listed company in the unregulated industry.  
Last but not least, conclusions and inspirations are presented in Chapter 6. 
We summarize main research conclusions in the dissertation and propose some 
meaningful suggestions for improving earnings quality in Chinese listed 
companies. In addition, insufficiency in this dissertation and possible further 
work are also addressed shortly. 
Key theoretical and empirical contributions of this dissertation are as 
follows: 














construct, at the first time in the generalized sense, the theoretical analysis 
framework for the relationship between ownership characteristics and earnings 
quality. Based on the proposed analysis framework, we point out that in 
countries, where firms have relatively concentrated ownership, ownership 
characteristics of large shareholders are the most influential mechanism for 
earnings quality at the company level, which provides a new, important 
theoretical basis for analyzing the influential factors of earnings quality. 
From the viewpoint of empirical research, this dissertation carries out 
all-side empirical tests for the influences of large shareholders' ownership 
characteristics on earnings quality in Chinese listed companies, using earnings 
management and value relevance to concretize earnings quality. Our empirical 
tests are performed in different respects, such as the status of the ultimate owner, 
the status of large shareholders, the ownership proportion of large shareholders, 
and ownership balancing mechanism. Therefore, this dissertation provides more 
convincing systematic analysis results than before. 
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